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Ardeshir Kianercy and Aram Galstyan
Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, Marina del Rey, CA 90292, USA
This paper presents a model of network formation in repeated games where the players adapt
their strategies and network ties simultaneously using a simple reinforcement learning scheme. It
is demonstrated that the co-evolutionary dynamics of such systems can be described via coupled
replicator equations. We provide a comprehensive analysis for three-player two-action games, which
is the minimum system size with nontrivial structural dynamics. In particular, we characterize the
Nash equilibria (NE) in such games and examine the local stability of the rest points corresponding
to those equilibria. We also study general n-player networks via both simulations and analytical
methods and find that in the absence of exploration, the stable equilibria consist of star motifs as
the main building blocks of the network. Furthermore, in all stable equilibria the agents play pure
strategies, even when the game allows mixed NE. Finally, we study the impact of exploration on
learning outcomes, and observe that there is a critical exploration rate above which the symmetric
and uniformly connected network topology becomes stable.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb,05.45.-a,02.50.Le,87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks depict complex systems where nodes corre-
spond to entities and links encode interdependencies be-
tween them. Generally, dynamics in networks is intro-
duced via two different approaches. In the first approach,
the links are assumed to be static, while the nodes are en-
dowed with internal dynamics (epidemic spreading, opin-
ion formation, signaling, synchronizing and so on). And
in the second approach, nodes are treated as passive ele-
ments, and the main focus is on the evolution of network
topology.
More recently, it has been suggested that separating
individual and network dynamics fails to capture real-
istic behavior of networks. Indeed, in most real–world
networks both the attributes of individuals (nodes) and
the topology of the network (links) evolve in tandem.
Models of such adaptive co-evolving networks have at-
tracted significant interest in recent years both in statis-
tical physics [1–5] and game theory and behavioral eco-
nomics communities [6–11].
To describe coupled dynamics of individual attributes
and network topology, here we suggest a simple model of
a coevolving network that is based on the notion of inter-
acting adaptive agents. Specifically, we propose network–
augmented multiagent systems where the agents play re-
peated games with their neighbors, and adapt both their
behaviors and the network ties depending on the out-
come of their interactions. To adapt, the agents use a
simple learning mechanism to reinforce (penalize) be-
haviors and network links that produce favorable (un-
favorable) outcomes. Furthermore, the agents use an
action selection mechanism that allows one to control
exploration/exploitation tradeoff via a temperature-like
parameter.
We have previously demonstrated [12] that the collec-
tive evolution of such a system can be described by ap-
propriately defined replicator dynamics equations. Orig-
inally suggested in the context of evolutionary game the-
ory (e.g., see Refs. [13, 14]), replicator equations have
been used to model collective learning in systems of in-
teracting self–interested agents [15]. Refrence [12] pro-
vides a generalization to the scenario where the agents
adapt not only their strategies (probability of selecting a
certain action) but also their network structure (the set
of other agents that play against). This generalization
results in a system of coupled non-linear equations that
describe the simultaneous evolution of agent strategies
and network topology.
Here we use the framework suggested in Ref. [12] to
examine the learning outcomes in networked games. We
provide a comprehensive analysis of three-player two-
action games, which are the simplest systems that ex-
hibit non-trivial structural dynamics. We analytically
characterize the rest-points and their stability properties
in the absence of exploration. Our results indicate that
in the absence of exploration, the agents always play pure
strategies even when the game allows mixed NE. For the
general n-player case, we find that the stable outcomes
correspond to star-like motifs, and demonstrate analyti-
cally the stability of a star motif. We also demonstrate
the instability of the symmetric network configuration
where all the pairs are connected to each other with uni-
form weights.
We also study the the impact of exploration on the co-
evolutionary dynamics. In particular, our results indicate
that there is a critical exploration rate above which the
uniformly connected network is a globally stable outcome
of the learning dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we next
derive the replicator equations characterizing the coevo-
lution of the network structure and the strategies of the
agents. In Sec. III we focus on learning without explo-
ration, describe the NE of the game, and characterize the
restpoints of learning dynamics according to their stabil-
ity properties. We consider the the impact of exploration
on learning in Sec. IV and provide some concluding re-
marks in Sec. V.
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2II. CO-EVOLVING NETWORKS VIA
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Let us consider a set of agents that play repeated
games with each other. We differentiate agents by in-
dices x, y, z, . . .. At each round of the game, an agent
has to choose another agent to play with, and an action
from the pool of available actions. Thus, time–dependent
mixed strategies of agents are characterized by a joint
probability distribution over the choice of the neighbors
and the actions.
We assume that the agents adapt to their environment
through a simple reinforcement mechanism. Among dif-
ferent reinforcement schemes, here we focus on (stateless)
Q-learning [16]. Within this scheme, the strategies of
the agents are parameterized through, so-called Q func-
tions that characterize the relative utility of a particular
strategy. After each round of game, the Q functions are
updated according to the following rule,
Qixy(t+ 1) = Q
i
xy(t) + α[R
i
x,y(t)−Qixy(t)] (1)
where Rix,y(Q
i
x,y) is the expected reward (Q value) of
agent x for playing action i with agent y, and α is a
parameter that determines the learning rate (which can
be set to α = 1 without a loss of generality).
Next, we have to specify how agents choose a neighbor
and an action based on their Q function. Here we use the
Boltzmann exploration mechanism where the probability
of a particular choice is given as [17]
pixy =
eβQ
i
xy∑
y˜,j e
βQjxy˜
(2)
where pixy is the probability that agent x will play with
agent y and choose action i. Here the inverse temperature
β ≡ 1/T > 0 controls the tradeoff between exploration
and exploitation; for T → 0 the agents always choose the
action corresponding to the maximum Q value, while for
T →∞ the agents’ choices are completely random.
We now assume that the agents interact with each
other many times between two consecutive updates of
their strategies. In this case, the reward of the i th agent
in Eq. ( 1) should be understood in terms of the average
reward, where the average is taken over the strategies of
other agents, Rix,y =
∑
j A
ij
xyp
j
yx, where A
ij
xy is the re-
ward (payoff) of agent x playing strategy i against agent
y who plays strategy j. Note that, generally speaking,
the payoff might be asymmetric.
We are interested in the continuous approximation to
the learning dynamics. Thus, we replace t+ 1 → t+ δt,
α→ αδt, and take the limit δt→ 0 in Eq. (1) to obtain
Q˙ixy = α[R
i
x,y −Qixy(t)] (3)
Differentiating Eq. (2), using Eqs. (2) and (3), and scal-
ing the time t→ αβt, we obtain the following replicator
equation [15]:
p˙ixy
pixy
=
∑
j
Aijxyp
j
yx −
∑
i,j,y˜
Aijxy˜p
i
xy˜p
j
y˜x + T
∑
y˜,j
pjxy˜ ln
pjxy˜
pixy
(4)
Equations 4 describe the collective adaptation of the Q–
learning agents through repeated game–dynamical inter-
actions. The first two terms indicate that the probabil-
ity of playing a particular pure strategy increases with a
rate proportional to the overall goodness of that strat-
egy, which mimics fitness-based selection mechanisms in
population biology [13]. The second term, which has an
entropic meaning, does not have a direct analog in pop-
ulation biology [15]. This term is due to the Boltzmann
selection mechanism that describes the agents’ tendency
to randomize over their strategies. Note that for T = 0
this term disappears, so the equations reduce to the con-
ventional replicator system [13].
So far, we have discussed learning dynamics over a
general strategy space. We now make the assumption
that the agents’ strategies factorize as follows,
pixy = cxyp
i
x ,
∑
y
cxy = 1,
∑
i
pix = 1. (5)
Here cxy is the probability that the agent x will initiate
a game with the agent y, whereas pix is the probability
that he will choose action i. Thus, the assumption behind
this factorization is that the probability that the agent
will perform action i is independent of whom the game
is played against. Substituting Eq. (5) in Eq. (4) yields
c˙xyp
i
x + cxyp˙
i
x = cxyp
i
x
[∑
j
aijxycyxp
j
y −
∑
i,y,j
aijx,ycxycyxp
i
xp
j
y
−T
[
ln cxy + ln p
i
x −
∑
y
cxy ln cxy −
∑
j
pjx ln p
j
x
]]
(6)
Next, we sum both sides in Eq. (6), once over y and then
over i, and make use of the normalization conditions in
Eq. (5) to obtain the following coevolutionary dynamics
of action and connection probabilities:
p˙ix
pix
=
∑
y˜,j
Aijxy˜cxy˜cy˜xp
j
y˜ −
∑
i,j,y˜
Aijxy˜cxy˜cy˜xp
i
xp
j
y˜
+ T
∑
j
pjx ln(p
j
x/p
i
x) (7)
c˙xy
cxy
= cyx
∑
i,j
Aijxyp
i
xp
j
y −
∑
i,j,y˜
Aijxy˜cxy˜cy˜xp
i
xp
j
y˜
+ T
∑
y˜
cxy˜ ln(cxy˜/cxy) (8)
Equations (7) and (8) are the replicator equations
that describe the collective evolution of both the agents’
strategies and the network structure.
The following remark is due: Generally, the replicator
dynamics in matrix games are invariant with respect to
3adding any column vector to the payoff matrix. However,
this invariance does not hold in the present networked
game. The reason for this is the following: if an agent
does not have any incoming links (i.e., no other agent
plays with him or her), then he always gets a zero re-
ward. Thus, the zero reward of an isolated agent serves
as a reference point. This poses a certain problem. For
instance, consider a trivial game with a constant reward
matrix aij = P . If P > 0, then the agents will tend to
play with each other, whereas for P < 0 they will try to
avoid the game by isolating themselves (i.e., linking to
agents that do not reciprocate).
To address this issue, we introduce an isolation payoff
CI that an isolated agent receives at each round of the
game. It can be shown that the introduction of t his
payoff merely subtracts CI from the reward matrix in
the replicator learning dynamics. Thus, we paramet rize
the game matrix as follows:
aij = bij + CI (9)
where matrix B defines a specific game.
Although it is beyond the scope of the present paper,
an interesting question is what the reasonable values for
the parameter CI are. In fact, what is important is the
value of CI relative to the reward at the corresponding
Nash equilibria, i.e., whether not playing at all is better
than playing and receiving a potentially negative reward.
Different values of CI describe different situations. In
particular, one can argue that certain social interactions
are apparently characterized by large CI , where not par-
ticipating in a game is seen as a worse outcome than par-
ticipating and getting negative rewards. In the following,
we treat CI as an additional parameter that changes in
a certain range, and examine its impact on the learning
dynamics.
A. Two-action games
We focus on symmetric games where the reward matrix
is the same for all pairs (x, y), Axy = A:
A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
(10)
Let pα, α ∈ {x, y, . . . , }, denote the probability for agent
α to play action 1 and cxy is the probability that agent
x will initiate a game with the agent y. For two action
games, the learning dynamics Eqs. (7) , and (8) becomes:
p˙x
px(1− px) =
∑
y˜
(apy˜ + b)cxy˜cy˜x + T log
1− px
px
(11)
c˙xy
cxy
= rxy −Rx + T
∑
y˜
cxy˜ ln
cxy˜
cxy
(12)
b
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Categorization of two-action games
based on the reward matrix structure in the (a, b) plane.
where
rxy = cyx(apxpy + bpx + dpy + a22) (13)
Rx =
∑
y˜
(apxpy˜ + bpx + dpy˜ + a22)cxy˜cy˜x (14)
Here we have defined the following parameters:
a = a11 − a21 − a12 + a22 (15)
b = a12 − a22 (16)
d = a21 − a22 (17)
The parameters a and b allow a categorization of two
action games as follows (Fig. 1):
• dominant action games: − ba > 1 or − ba < 0
• coordination game: a > 0, b < 0 and 1 ≥ − ba
• anti-coordination (Chicken) game: a < 0, b >
0 and 1 ≥ − ba
Before proceeding further, we elaborate on the con-
nection between the rest points of the replicator system
for T = 0 and the game-theoretic notion of NE (NE) 1.
For T = 0 (no exploration) in the conventional replicator
equations, all NE are necessarily the rest points of the
learning dynamic. The inverse is not true - not all rest
points correspond to NE - and only the stable ones do.
Note that in the present model the first statement does
not necessarily hold. This is because we have assumed
the strategy Eq.( 5), due to which equilibria where the
1 Recall that a joint strategy profile is called NE if no agent can
increase his expected reward by unilaterally deviating from the
equilibrium.
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FIG. 2: Examples of reward matrices for typical two-action
games.
agents adopt different strategies with different players are
not allowed. Thus, any NE that do not have the factor-
ized form simply cannot be described in this framework.
The second statement, however, remains true, and stable
rest points do correspond to NE.
III. LEARNING WITHOUT EXPLORATION
For T = 0, the learning dynamics Equations (11), (12)
attain the following form:
p˙x
px(1− px) =
∑
y˜
(apy˜ + b)cxy˜cy˜x (18)
c˙xy
cxy
= rxy −Rx (19)
Consider the dynamics of the strategies given by
Eq. 18. Clearly, the vertices of the simplex, px = {0, 1}
are the rest points of the dynamics. Furthermore, in
case the game allows a mixed NE, then the configuration
where all the agents play the mixed NE px = −b/a is
also a rest point of the dynamics. As is shown below,
however, this configuration is not stable, and for T = 0,
the only stable configurations correspond to the agents
playing pure strategies.
A. Three-player games
We now consider the case of three players in two-action
games. This scenario is simple enough for studying it
comprehensively, yet it still has non-trivial structural dy-
namics, as we demonstrate below.
1. Nash equilibria
We start by examining the NE for two classes of two-
action games, prisoner dilemma (PD) and a coordination
game. 2 In PD, the players have to choose between Co-
2 The behavior of the coordination and anti-coordination games
are qualitatively similar in the context of the present work, so
here we do not consider the latter.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Three-player network NE for prisoner’s
dilemma and the coordination game; see the text for more
details.
operation and Defection, and the payoff matrix elements
satisfy b21 > b11 > b22 > b12; (see Fig. 2). In a two-
player PD game, defection is a dominant strategy – it al-
ways yields a better reward regardless of the other player
choice – thus, the only NE is a mutual defection. And in
coordination game, the players have an incentive to se-
lect the same action. This game has two pure NE, where
the agents choose the same action, as well as a mixed
NE. In a general coordination game the reward elements
have the relationship b11 > b21, b22 > b12 (see Fig. 2).
In the three-agent scenario, a simple analysis yields
four possible network topologies corresponding to NE de-
picted in Fig. 3. In all of those configurations, the agents
that are not isolated select strategies that correspond
to two-agent NE. Thus, in the case of PD, non-isolated
agents always defect, whereas for the coordination game,
they can select one of three possible NE. We now examine
those configurations in more details.
Configuration I In this configuration, the agents x
and y play only with each other, whereas agent is z s
isolated: cxy = cyx = 1. Note that for this to be a NE,
agents x and y should not be “tempted” to switch and
play with the agent z. For instance, in the case of PD,
this yields pzb21 < b22, otherwise players x and y will be
better of linking with the isolated agent z and exploiting
his cooperative behavior. 3
Configuration II In the second configuration, there
is a central agent (z) who plays with the other two:
cxz = cyz = 1, czx+czy = 1. Note that this configuration
is continuously degenerate as the central agent can
3 Note that the dynamics will eventually lead to a different rest
point where z is now plays defect with both x and y.
5distribute his link weight arbitrarily among the two
players. Additionally, the isolation payoff should be
smaller then than the reward at the equilibrium (e.g.,
b22 > CI for PD). Indeed, if the latter condition is
reversed, then one of the agents, say x, is better off
linking with y instead of z, thus “avoiding” the game
altogether.
Configuration III: The third configuration corre-
sponds to a uniformly connected networks where all
the links have the same weight cxy = cyz = ccx =
1
2 .
It is easy to see that when all three agents play NE
strategies, there is no incentive to deviate from the
uniform network structure.
Configuration IV: Finally, in the last configuration
none of the links are reciprocated so that the players do
not play with each other: cxycyx = cxzczx = cyzczy = 0.
This cyclic network is a NE when the isolation payoff CI
is greater than the expected reward of playing NE in the
respective game.
2. Stable rest points of learning dynamics
The factorized NE discussed in the previous section
are the rest points of the replicator dynamics. However,
not all of those rest points are stable, so that not all the
equilibria can be achieved via learning. We now discuss
the stability property of the rest points.
One of the main outcomes of our stability analysis is
that at T = 0 the symmetric network configuration is not
stable. This is in fact a more general results that applies
to n-agent networks, as is shown in the next section. As
we will demonstrate later, the symmetric network can be
stabilized when one allows exploration.
The second important observation is that even when
the game allows mixed NE, such as in the coordination
game, any network configuration where the agents play
mixed strategy is unstable for T = 0 (see Appendix A).
Thus, the only outcome of the learning is a configuration
where the agents play pure strategies.
The surviving (stable) configurations are listed in
Fig. 4. Their stability can be established by analyzing
the eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian. Consider,
for instance, the configuration with one isolated player.
The corresponding eigenvalues are
λ1 = rxz − rxy , λ2 = ryz − ryx , λ3 = 0
λ4 = (1− 2px)(r1x − r2x) < 0 ,
λ5 = (1− 2py)(r1y − r2y) < 0 , λ6 = 0
For PD this configuration is marginally stable when
agents x and y play defect and rxy > 0 and ryx > 0.
It happens only when b22 ≥ −CI which means that
the isolation payoff should be less than the expected re-
ward for defection. Furthermore, one should also have
rxz < rxy , ryz < ryx, which indicates that the neither
!"#$%&'()*+,-.#/)*0'1*'!"#$%&'"($)*#+',,-).-,'))
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Stable rest points of the learning
dynamics for PD (upper panel) and the coordination game
(lower panel).
x nor y would get a better expected reward by switching
and playing with z (e.g., condition for NE). And for the
coordination game , assuming that b11 > b22 this config-
uration is stable when b11 ≥ −CI > b22 and b22 ≥ −CI .
Similar reasoning can be used for the other configu-
rations shown in Fig. 4. Note, finally, that there is a
coexistence of multiple equlibria for range of parameter,
except when the isolation payoff is sufficiently large, for
which the cyclic (non-reciprocated) network is the only
stable configuration.
B. n-player games
In addition to the three agent scenario, we also ex-
amined the co-evolutionary dynamics of general n-agent
systems, using both simulations and analytical methods.
We observed in our simulations that the stable outcomes
of the learning dynamic consist of star motifs Sn (Fig. 5),
where a central node of degree n − 1 connects to n − 1
nodes of degree 1. 4 Furthermore, we observed that the
basin of attraction of motifs shrinks as motif size grows,
so that smaller motifs are more frequent.
4 This is true when the isolation payoff is smaller compared to
the NE payoff. In the opposite case the dynamics settles into a
configuration without reciprocated links.
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FIG. 5: Observed stable configurations of co-evolutionary dy-
namics for T = 0.
We now demonstrate the stability of the star motif
Sn in n player two action games. Let player x be the
central player, so that all other players are only con-
nected to x, cαx = 1. Recall that the Jacobian of the
system is a block diagonal matrix with blocks J11 with
elements
∂c˙ij
∂cmn
and J22 with has elements as
∂p˙m
∂pn
( see
Appendix A). When all players play a pure strategy
pi = 0, 1 in a star shape motif, it can be shown that
J22 is diagonal matrix with diagonal elements of form
(1−2px)
∑
y˜(apy˜ + b)cxy˜cy˜x, whereas J11 is an upper tri-
angular matrix, and its diagonal elements are either zero
or have the form −(apxpy + bpx + dpy + a22)cxy where x
is the central player.
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Nash Equilibrium cor-
responds to choosing the second action (defection) , i.e.
pα = 0. Then the diagonal elements of J22, and thus
its eigenvalues, equal bcxy˜. J11, on the other hand, has
n2−2n eigenvalues , (n−1) of them are zero and the rest
have the form of λ = −a22cxy˜. Since for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma one has b < 0 then the start structure is stable
as long as b22 > CI .
A similar reasoning can be used for the Coordination
game, for which one has b < 0 and a + b > 0. In this
case, the star structure is stable when either b11 > −CI or
b22 > −CI , depending on whether the agents coordinate
on the first or second actions, respectively.
We conclude this section by elaborating on the
(in)stability of the n-agent symmetric network configu-
ration, where each agent is connected to all the other
agents with the same connectivity 1n−1 . As shown in Ap-
pendix B, this configuration can be a rest point of the
learning dynamics Eq. (18) only when all agents play the
same strategy, which is either 0, 1 or −b/a. Consider
now the first block of the Jacobian in Eq. A1, i.e. J11.
It can be shown that the diagonal elements of J11 are
identically zero, so that Tr(J11) = 0. Thus, either all
the eigenvalues of J11 are zero (in which case the con-
figuration is marginally stable), or there is at least one
eigenvalue that is positive, thus making the symmetric
network configuration unstable at T = 0.
IV. LEARNING WITH EXPLORATION
In this section we consider the replicator dynamics for
non-vanishing exploration rate T > 0. For two agent
games, the effect of the exploration has been previously
examined in Ref. [18], where it was established that for a
class of games with multiple Nash equilibria the asymp-
totic behavior of learning dynamics undergoes a drastic
changes at critical exploration rates and only one of those
equilibria survives. Below, we study the impact of the ex-
ploration in the current networked version of the learning
dynamics.
For 3-player, 2- action games we have six independent
variables px, py, pz, cxy, cyz, andczx. The strategy vari-
ables evolve according to the following equations:
p˙x
(1− px)px = (apy + b)wxy + (apz + b)wxz + T log
1− px
px
p˙y
(1− py)py = (apz + b)wyz + (apx + b)wxy + T log
1− py
py
p˙z
(1− pz)pz = (apx + b)wxz + (apy + b)wyz + T log
1− pz
pz
c˙xy
cxy(1− cxy) = rxy − rxz + T log
1− cxy
cxy
c˙yz
cyz(1− cyz) = ryz − ryx + T log
1− cyz
cyz
c˙zx
czx(1− czx) = rzx − rzy + T log
1− czx
czx
Here we have defined wxy = cxy(1 − cyz), wxz = (1 −
cxy)czx, and wyz = cyz(1−czx), and a, b, andd are defined
in Eqs. 15, 16 and 17.
Figure 6(a) shows three possible network configura-
tions that correspond to the fixed points of the above
dynamics. The first two configurations are perturbed ver-
sion of a star motif ( stable solution for T = 0), whereas
the third one corresponds to a symmetric network where
all players connect to the other players with equal link
weights.
Furthermore, in Fig. 6(b) we show the behavior of the
learning outcomes for a PD game, as one varies the tem-
perature. For sufficiently small T , the only stable config-
urations are the perturbed star motifs, and the symmet-
ric network is unstable. However, there is a critical value
Tc above which the symmetric network becomes globally
stable.
Next, we consider the stability of the symmetric net-
works. As shown in Appendix B, the only possible solu-
tion in this configuration is when all the agents play the
same strategy, which can be found from the following
equation:
(ap+ b) = 2T log
p
1− p (20)
The behavior of this equation (without the factor 2 in the
right-hand side) was analyzed in details in Ref. [18]. In
7Perturbed pure NE 0<p<1 
Strong connection Weak connection Uniform connection  
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FIG. 6: a) (Color online) Possible network configurations for
three-player PD (Fig. 2)., (b) Bifurcation diagram for varying
temperature. Two blue solid lines correspond to the config-
urations with one isolated agent and one central agent. The
symmetric network configuration is unstable at low temper-
ature (red line), and becomes globally stable above a critical
temperature.
particular, for games with a single NE, this equation al-
lows a single solution that corresponds to the perturbed
NE. For games with multiple equilibria, on the other
hand, there is a critical exploration rate Tc: For T < Tc
there are two stable solutions and one unstable solution,
whereas for T ≥ Tc there is a single globally stable solu-
tion.
We use these insights to examine the stability of the
symmetric network configuration for the coordination
game, depending on the parameters T and CI ; see Ap-
pendix C. In this example a = 5 , b = −2 and d = 1
for all three agents. Figure 7 shows the bifurcation dia-
gram of p (probability of choosing the first action) plot-
ted versus T . Below the critical temperature, there are
three three solutions, two of which (that correspond to
the perturbed pure NE) are stable. And Fig. (7) shows
the domain of T and CI for stable homogenous equilib-
rium. When T → 0, the domain of CI shrinks until it
becomes a point at T = 0 where −CI is equal to the NE
Tc
−b22
−b11
FIG. 7: (Color online) Impact of the exploration on the sta-
ble outcomes of a coordination game in Fig. (2). The top
panel shows the bifurcation of strategy p versus T , whereas
the bottom panel shows the stability region of the symmetric
network configuration in the CI − T plane. Here the critical
temperature is Tc = 0.36.
reward (Fig. 7).
V. DISCUSSION
We have studied the co-evolutionary dynamics
of strategies and link structure in a network of
reinforcement-learning agents. By assuming that the
agents’ strategies allow appropriate factorization, we de-
rived a system of a coupled replicator equations that de-
scribe the mutual evolution of agent behavior and net-
work topology. We used these equations to fully charac-
terize the stable learning outcomes in the case of three
agents and two action games. We also established some
analytical results for the more general case of n-player
two-action games.
We demonstrated that in the absence of any strat-
8egy exploration (zero temperature limit) learning leads
to a network composed of star-like motifs. Furthermore,
the agents on those networks play only pure NE, even
when the game allows a mixed NE. Also, even though
the learning dynamics allows rest points with a uniform
network (e.g., an agent plays with all the other agents
with the same probability) , those equilibria are not sta-
ble at T = 0. The situation changes when the agents
explore their strategy space. In this case, the stable net-
work structures undergo bifurcation as one changes the
exploration rate. In particular, there is a critical explo-
ration rate above which the uniform network becomes a
globally stable outcome of the learning dynamics.
We note that the main premise behind the strategy fac-
torization use here is that the agents use the same strat-
egy profile irrespective of whom they play against. While
this assumption is perhaps valid under certain circum-
stances, it certainly has its limitations that need to be
studied further through analytical results and empirical
data. Furthermore, the other extreme where the agent
employs unique strategy profiles for each of his partners
does not seem very realistic either, as it would impose
considerable cognitive load on the agent. A more realis-
tic assumption is that the agent has a few strategy profile
that roughly corresponds to the type of agent he is in-
teracting with. The approach presented here can be, in
principle, generalized to the latter scenario.
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Appendix A: Local Stability Analysis of the Rest
Points
To study the local stability properties of the rest points
in the system given by Eqs.18 and 19 , we need to analyze
the eigenvalues of the corresponding Jacobian matrix.
For n-player two-action game, we have n action variables
and l = n(n− 2) link variables, so that the total number
of independent dynamical variables is n + l = n(n − 1).
We can represent the Jacobian as follows,
J =

∂c˙ij
∂cmn
∂c˙ij
∂pm
∂p˙m
∂cij
∂p˙m
∂pn
 = (J11 J12J21 J22
)
(A1)
Here the diagonal blocks J11 and J22 are l× l and n× n
square matrices, respectively. Similarly, J12 and J21 are
l × n and n× l matrices, respectively.
In the most general case, the full analysis of the Jaco-
bian is intractable. However, the problem can be simpli-
fied for T = 0. Indeed, consider the lower off-diagonal
block of the Jacobian, J21, the elements of which have
the form
∂p˙i
∂cij
= pi(1− pi)cji(api + b) (A2)
Consulting the rest point condition given by Eqs. 18, one
can see that J21 is identically zero. By using the block
matrix determinant identity, the characteristic polyno-
mial of the Jacobian assumes the following factorized
form
p(λ) = det(J11 − λI)det(J22 − λI) = 0 (A3)
The above factorization facilitates the stability analysis
for certain cases that we now focus on:
a. (In)Stability of mixed strategies for T = 0 Let us
show that the configurations where the agents mix either
on their actions or links cannot be stable at T = 0. Here
we just need to consider the submatrix J22. We now
show that this matrix always has at least one positive
eigenvalues when players adopt the mixed NE p = −b/a.
Indeed, it can be shown that J22 is a non-zero matrix
with zero diagonal elements. Recall that for any square
matrix A the Tr(A) =
∑
λi then Tr(J11) = 0 means at
least one of its eigenvalues is always positive, so that the
mixed Nash configuration is unstable. The same line of
reasoning can be applied to the configuration where the
agents mix over the links.
Appendix B: Agent Strategies in Symmetric
Networks
Let us consider a two-action n-players game. Each
player i chooses action one with probability pi. Here we
prove that player n and player n−1 in a homogenous net-
work have the same strategy, i.e., pn = pn−1. Consider
Eq. (11) for players n, n− 1 and n− 2,
p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pn−2 + pn−1 = k log pn
1− pn − c (B1)
p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pn−2 + pn = k log pn−1
1− pn−1 − c (B2)
where
K = −T (n− 1)
2
a
, c =
b(n− 1)
a
(B3)
Also, let us define a function g as
g(pn) = xn + k log
pn
(1− pn) (B4)
Now , by subtracting the two Eqs.(B1) and (B2), we
have g(pn) = g(pn−1). Since 0 < pi < 1 , then function
g is a monotonic function, so g(pn) = g(pn−1) ↔ pn =
pn−1. By repeating the same reasoning for the remaining
pi one can prove that p1 = p2 = · · · = pn.
9Appendix C: Stability of Symmetric three-player
network
For three-player two-action games, the Jacobian cor-
responding to the symmetric network configuration con-
sists of the following blocks:
J11 =
−T −v −v−v −T −v
−v −v −T
 , (C1)
J12 =
 0 m −m−m 0 m
m −m 0
 , (C2)
J21 =
 0 −g gg 0 −g
−g g 0
 , (C3)
J22 =
−T k kk −T k
k k −T
 , (C4)
where we have defined
v =
ap2 + bp+ dp+ b22 + CI
4
, (C5)
m =
ap+ d
8
, (C6)
g =
p(1− p)(ap+ b)
2
, (C7)
k =
ap(1− p)
4
, (C8)
and p is the probability of selecting the first action, which
is the same for all the agents in the symmetric network
configuration. The six eigenvalues that determine the
stability of the configuration can be calculated analyti-
cally and are as follows:
λ1 = 2k − T,
λ2 = −T − 2v,
λ3,4 =
1
2
(−k − 2T + v −
√
12gm+ (k + v)2),
λ5,6 =
1
2
(−k − 2T + v +
√
12gm+ (k + v)2).
These expressions can be used to (numerically) identify
the stability region of the configuration in the parameter
space (T,CI), as shown in Fig. 7.
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